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The years 1998 to 2004 of Vajpayee’s government saw a turning point in India-U.S. 
relations. Although the first major decision this government made – the 1998 nuclear testing 
– brought on immediate sanctions from the United States, the warming detectible afterward 
has not waned. In January 2004, the two countries launched a joint initiative baptized Next 
Step in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a development to which Ambassador Blackwill - a 
close advisor to George W. Bush whose team in Washington he later joined - made a 
significant contribution. 
Fewer than six months later, the coalition backing the Vajpayee government 
conceded power to a new Congress-led alliance christened the United Progressive Alliance. 
Much speculation was made about a return to the doctrine of non-alignment, at least of a 
stauncher defense of multilateralism, and indeed, the government was composed of enough 
elected officials in their seventies to lend a certain credence to this theory, given their stint in 
power in the 1970s and 1980s. 
But nothing of the sort occurred, and beyond mere continuity, one can even speak of 
a deepening of relations between the United States and India. This process has to do in part 
with factors reaching beyond strategic and diplomatic considerations that pertain to the 
economy and social ties currently linking the two countries. 
 
                                                
1 Director of the CERI (Sciences-Po/CNRS); recently published, Inde: la démocratie par la caste. Histoire d’une 
mutation socio-politique (1885-2005), Fayard, 2005.  




Pursuing the diplomatic and strategic rapprochement. 
If during the summer of 2004, chancelleries were trying to get their bearings as New 
Delhi sought to define the proper distance with Washington, by autumn Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh allayed the fears of those who in both the U.S. and India were worried 
that the ideological legacy of the Congress would call into question the Indian-U.S. 
rapprochement. In fact he very quickly switched to a “realpolitik” they could accept.2  
The signs of continuity in India-U.S. relations are many:  
 - joint military maneuvers involving the army, the navy and the air force had 
become perfectly routine under Vajpayee’s government; they have continued apace. For 
instance, in October 2004 joint exercises with the Indian and U.S. navy took place in Goa. 
For the first time, the United States engaged P3C Orion aircraft specialized in maritime 
surveillance in these operations. 
 
 - The United States and India concluded an ”open skies” agreement in January 
2005, ratified in April 2005. This agreement, replacing the 1956 Air Service Agreement, 
allows any Indian or American airline to establish service between any city in their two 
countries. Air India immediately announced it would increase its scheduled flights from 28 to 
37 a week, a telling sign of the intensity of exchanges. 
 
 - India hastened to join the coalition of donors initiated by the United States after 
the tsunami on December 26, 2004. This coalition, which grouped Japan and Australia as 
well, did not last, but it nevertheless demonstrated India’s propensity to follow U.S. initiatives 
rather than adhere to a purely multilateral rationale.3 The contrast with the Arab-Latin 
America summit held in Brasilia in May 2005 is striking: in this context some thirty countries 
in these two regions went so far as to denounce the unilateralism of the U.S. move. 
 
 - India refrained from declaring sanctions against the United States when the latter 
delayed repealing the Byrd Amendment4 after the WTO ruled it to be illegal. Indian 
complacency was all the more significant since New Delhi had referred a complaint to the 
                                                
2 In response to communists who objected to the warmth of tone with which he congratulated George Bush on his 
reelection he replied: “…we have to look at the realities of the world. International relations are, in the final 
analysis, power relations. And we are living in a world of unequal power. We cannot wish away the realities of this 
situation. We have to use the available international system to promote our interests. And, therefore, we have a 
necessity to engage the U.S. The U.S. plays a very important role in the world economy, the political world 
system and we cannot wish that away.”  The Hindu, 11/8/2004 
3 In an interview granted to India Today during her first visit to India – and even Asia – as Secretary of State, C. 
Rice expressed great satisfaction with the way in which India had joined the U.S. initiative three months earlier 
(India Today, 03/28/2005, p. 64). 
4 This amendment directs the US government to distribute the anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties to the US 
companies that brought forward the cases. 




WTO to denounce Washington’s payment of anti-dumping duty proceeds to United States 
industry and that Canada, co-complainant, had imposed sanctions.5 
 
 - Although Indian Airlines purchased 43 aircraft from Airbus in 2004, the following 
year Air India announced an order for 50 Boeing 787 Dreamliners in circumstances that 
baffled its European competitor: While the A380 had just finished its first test flights, the 
Indian company chose an aircraft for which tests will not begin before 2007. 6   
 
 - The Indian-Israeli rapprochement has also followed its course. This is not 
unconnected to India-U.S. relations. The Indian initiative of reestablishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel in 1991 was in part aimed at Washington: it was a way of “getting at” the 
United States. For the coalition parties in power today the Indian-Israeli rapprochement, 
which culminated in September 2003 with Ariel Sharon’s visit to New Delhi, was much more 
open to criticism than the Indian-U.S. rapprochement. The communists were appalled by it. 
A year after Manmohan Signh came to power nothing, or nearly nothing, has changed: 
military cooperation between the two countries has not slackened7 and the government has 
not really readjusted its relations with the Middle East in favor of its old Arab allies. It is 
significant that the only Indian official to have made the trip to attend the funeral of Yasser 
Arafat – a close friend of the Nehru/Gandhi family – was Natwar Singh, minister of foreign 
affairs. 
The communists may have secured the suspension of joint military maneuvers 
between the Indian and Israeli armies, but this is the only concession that has been made to 
them so far.  
 
American ambivalence and Indian expectations 
At first glance, the pursuance of the Indian-United States rapprochement intrigues 
observers all the more since New Delhi does not seem able to obtain what it demands in 
exchange. 
                                                
5 The Hindu, 04/09/2005 
6 EADS officials were openly offended at not being given the same treatment as their competitors, in particular for 
not being allowed to present their product under the same conditions. The Indian authorities argued that since the 
decision involved renewing their fleet, the airline companies were free to make their own choices. However, given 
that these are state-owned companies, it is highly likely that political power influenced - or accompanied - the final 
decision. 
7 The third meeting of the Joint Working Group on military cooperation was held in Jerusalem in December 2004. 
Joint development of a ballistic missile was allegedly on the agenda. 




Up to now, the NSSP has not fulfilled its promises. This agreement pertains to four 
types of issues: closer collaboration in the civilian nuclear and space industries, more trade 
in high technologies, and an expanded dialogue on missile defense. 
A year and a half after the NSSP was signed, only the first two items on this agenda 
have been broached in any significant manner – but without yielding any noteworthy results. 
In the field of nuclear energy, India has not obtained the aid it hoped the United 
States would grant for the maintenance – and modernization – of its four nuclear energy 
plants, despite their coming under AIEA rules. First, the United States claims – not without 
reason - to be bound by the rules of the NPT, which India did not sign; second, it fears that 
Indian scientists will encourage proliferation. In October 2004, they imposed penalties on 
two retired Indian engineers suspected of having helped Iran develop its nuclear program. 
There seems to have been some thaw in this regard in February 2005 when the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission invited Indian scientists to discuss the risks that natural 
disasters posed for the country’s nuclear installations. Members of India’s Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board went to the United States for six months in this context – which did not 
escaped the Pakistani press!8 All the same, India just announced that it planned to work with 
Russia in building a new nuclear power plant – when a similar type of installation is already 
under construction in Tamil Nadu.9 This announcement could very well have been made to 
put pressure on the United States. 
 
In space technology, the United States has only made two concessions to India to 
date: the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organisation was struck from the list 
of entities banned from receiving any technology transfer, and the seven ISRO subsidiaries 
remaining on this list are now allowed to import materials that can be used for dual purposes 
figuring on the two lists of sensitive technologies with much flexibility. 
However, these gestures seem like a fool’s game because, first of all, ISRO 
headquarters does not import high technology and, second, the two lists of materials now 
accessible to its subsidiaries contain no sophisticated technology. 
 
Moreover, India has not managed to loosen the ties created between the United 
States and Pakistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as attest the granting of 3 
billion dollars in civil and military aid secured by Islamabad and Washington’s complacency 
in the case of A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb whose nuclear dissemination 
                                                
8 Dawn 13/02/2005. 
9 The Russians are in fact building a 2,000-megawatt plant in Kudankulam, which should come into service in 
2007.  




(even proliferation) activities can scarcely be doubted.10 The symbol of this “full-scale 
strategic relationship” - to use the terms of the American ambassador in Pakistan, Ryan C. 
Crocker, was, however, the announcement of the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad in 
March 2005. The Congress Party, which while in the opposition had already objected to 
Pakistan’s being named as one of its “Non NATO allies” by the United States in 2004, 
immediately objected that such a decision amounted to ignoring the use Pakistan could 
make of these weapons against India.11 Manmohan Singh voiced his disappointment to G. 
Bush in no uncertain terms.12 Despite this setback, the authorities claim to be as convinced 
as ever of the excellent relations their country enjoys with the United States. 
 
India is persuaded that the NSSP and other aspects of the cooperation between 
New Delhi and Washington are tantamount to recognition of India’s status as a nuclear 
power. In the eyes of many Indians, this is a remarkable evolution. 
New Delhi also entertains the conviction that the United States would given it access 
to highly sophisticated military equipment – as had already been the case with the Phalcon 
system. Now the Americans have offered to sell the Indians F-16s or F-18 “Hornets” when 
they announced the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. But the Indian army has always been very 
reluctant to purchase American equipment  due to the fickleness of the U.S. Congress, 
quick to accuse its clients of misconduct and impose sanctions on them – and hence stop 
delivery of spare parts. As soon as the American offer was made public, former Air Force 
chief Anil Tipnis and former Army chief Shankar Roychowdhury each separately made 
known to the government in general and the defense minister in particular their hostility to 
such a revolution in Indian military procurement. But the civil power may well disregard 
these objections, all the more so since the Americans may agree to technology transfers 
that would allow parts of these aircraft to be manufactured in India.13 In the long run, India 
can also hope to acquire the Patriot anti-missile missile. Preliminary discussions between 
Indian Air Force officials and Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials in the U.S. took 
place in April 2005. They continued during defense minister P. Mukherjee’s visit to the 
United States last June 28. The outcome demonstrated spectacular headway: a ten-year 
cooperation agreement providing for Indian-U.S. collaboration in joint production of military 
equipment, ballistic defense and intervention for peacekeeping operations in potentially 
                                                
10 Regarding U.S.-Pakistani relations, see S. Shafqat, “Pakistan and the United States: a future unlike the past ?,” 
Centre for the Study of Pakistan (Columbia University), Occasional Paper Series, March 2005. 
11 The Hindu, 29/03/2005 
12 Ibid, 26/03/2005 
13 Besides, in addition to the F-18s, the United States is considering selling India the E-2C HawkeyeAirborne Early 
Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, with which India would equip its Gorshkov aircraft carrier, as well as the 
P-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance plane. 




unstable areas abroad. This “New Framework for the Indo-U.S. Defense Relationship,” 
signed by Mukherjee and Rumsfeld, heralded a new era in relations between the two 
countries reflecting “common principles and shared national interest.” 
Last, New Delhi is counting on United States support to take advantage, when the 
time comes, of the UN Security Council reform which will allow India to occupy a permanent 
seat. However, Washington does not seem prepared to back India’s candidacy (or Japan’s, 
Brazil’s and Germany’s for that matter) unless it forgoes the right to veto that the permanent 
member status allows today. After having been discussed at length internally, this possibility 
seems excluded by the Indian authorities. The U.S. attitude on this issue has clearly caused 
deep disappointment on the Indian side. 
Beyond the diplomatic and strategic compensations that India expects from the 
United States, its good will toward the United States can be explained more structurally by 
the expansion of economic and social ties linking the two countries. 
 
Structural factors of the Indian-United States rapprochement. 
An trade partnership with a strong high tech content. The United States is India’s 
largest trading partner today. In both trade and investments, the expansion dates from the 
economic  reform undertaken in 1991. In 10 years, from 1992 to 2002, U.S. exports to India 
multiplied threefold,14 whereas American imports of Indian goods multiplied by 3.5.15 In 2004-
2005, the United States remain India’s more important trading partner with over 11.1 % of its 
foreign trade. 
The change is even more spectacular in the field of investments. The United States 
is the second largest foreign investor – after Maurice, through which country many American 
NRI16 investments are channeled for tax reasons – with 17.08% of the total in cumulated 
figures since 1991. The increase in American investments in India is linear and rapid, for the 
went from 319 million dollars in 2002-2003 to 522 million dollars in 2004.17 The number of 
American corporations in India has multiplied by 14 since 1991, numbering now over a 
thousand.18 
 
Along with the mass consumer products sold by Mc Donald’s, Dominos, Pizza Hut, 
Pepsi, Coca-Cola, Reebok, Nike and Avon, American investments are also made in 
                                                
14 From 2.8 billion dollars in 1992 to 6.4 billion dollars in 2002. 
15 From 4 to 14 billion dollars. 
16 Non Resident Indians constitute the business elite of the Indian diaspora in the United States.  
17  These figures are all taken from the Economic Survey 2004-2005, New Delhi, Government of India, 2005. 
18 Most American companies established in India have grown at a very satisfactory rate. Mc Donald’s, which for 
instance didn’t open in Delhi until 1996, had 40 sales points in India seven years later, in 2003, and had sold 45 
million burgers in the country!  




strategic areas of high technology, including in research and development. The computer 
engineers that India steadily produces and at meager salaries compared to labor costs in 
the United States, are a specific asset.  
 
Driven out of India by a wave of hostility toward U.S. multinationals in the 1970s, IBM 
is back again; with offices in 12 cities, the company employs 9,000 people and has 
developed a partnership with three of the best Indian Institutes of Technology, those in 
Delhi, Kanpur and Chennai, which supply it with internationally-qualified engineers. 
Hewlett-Packard, since it bought out Compaq in India, is still ahead in terms of labor 
with 10,000 employees and a network staking its presence in 120 cities. And Microsoft, 
whose largest foreign investments – other than industrial – have been made in India, has 
established its software development offices in Hyderabad. 
In general American computer companies all have set up major R & D offices in 
India. For instance, 80% of Oracle’s  5,000 Indian employees work in its Indian 
Development Center – the first center of this type outside of the United States for the firm, 
which set up in Bangalore in 1994. By the same token, Adobe’s development center was set 
up in Noida (near Delhi) in 1998. This is where Acrobat Reader was developed. As for 
Apple, its famous iPod was designed in the center that the company owns in Hyderabad – 
before being mass-produced in factories in Taiwan. The Texas Instruments R & D center in 
Bangalore – approximately 900 engineers – has already filed for 225 patents, mainly for 
computer chips. Another industry giant, Intel, is also based in Bangalore. The largest 
American company R & D center in India, however, is General Electrics, which employs 
22,000 people, including 1,800 computer engineers in Bangalore, which has enabled 95 
patents to be filed for in the United States. 
 
In the Spring of 2005, the Indo-US Science and Technology Forum decided to set up 
R & D centers in India in various sectors, including design engineering, energy and 
ecoinformatics. A center devoted to this specialized field has already opened in Bangalore. 
 
The magnitude of less sophisticated outsourcing will further increase the interlocking 
of Indian-U.S. business activities. Many banks, such as American Express, Citibank and 
Lehman Brothers and automobile manufacturers (Ford, General Motors) for instance have 
their accounting and much of their back office activity done in India. 




And the number of call centers is constantly on the rise. The largest U.S. company in 
the field, Convergys Corps, employs over 5,000 people in India although it only set up its 
first offices there in 2001. 
 
The influence of the diaspora and the student community. In addition to business 
activities, social ties play an extremely important role in the Indian-U.S. rapprochement. The 
primary factor in these is the Indian diaspora to the United States, a demographic mass that 
has doubled in 10 years to 2 million people. The flow of legal Indian immigrants is now 
greater than that of the Chinese. Many of them come to study computer engineering. If 
Oracle established offices in India so early on it is because among its management there 
are many Indians. Similarly, Adobe decided to set up in India on an initiative of its Indian 
managers of the company in the United States. In May 2005, the US Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) announced it would grant an additional 20,000 H1B visas19 to 
foreign graduates of American universities with a Master’s or higher level and specialized in 
state-of-the-art technology. This measure, aimed primarily to meet the demands of U.S. 
corporations in terms of computer engineers, works to the great benefit of Indian students 
seeking a job in the United States.  
Most Indian migrants, however, are students. Their numbers rose from 30,000 in 
1996-1997 to 75,000 in 2003-2004.20 Since 2002-2003, the contingent of Indian students is 
higher than any other group of foreign students.21  
 
These students – like their elders – are successful in the United States (when they 
don’t return home). The U.S. year 2000 census in fact shows that Indian-Americans have an 
average per capita income of  $60,093 compared to the national average of $38,885 (only 6 
% of them reportedly live below poverty level), which can be explained by the fact that three-
quarters of this community have attended university.22 The Indian diaspora is thus in a 
position to act as a lobby - particularly by financing the “Indian Caucus” in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate -, but also as a showcase for India, whose image has 
changed considerably in the United States: the age-old cliché of destitute poverty has been 
done away with. 
 
                                                
19 A quota of 65,000 visas in this category had already been decided earlier in the year. 
20 It doubled between 1998-1999 and 2002-2003 - in five years. 
21 They already made up 13 % of total, 74,603 out of 586,323, in 2002-2003. 
22 To temper the enthusiasm these figures incite, it is worth reading S. Khagram, M. Desai and J. Varughese, 
“Seen, rich but unheard? The politics of Asian Indians in the United States” in Gordon H. Chang (ed.) Asian 
Americans and Politics, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center / Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 258-284 




Obstacles and contradictions 
Is the weight of structural factors – as much in economic terms as in social terms - 
enough to consolidate the Indian-U.S. rapprochement observable today in the diplomatic 
and strategic spheres? 
India is probably justified in expecting more constructive gestures from the United 
States, given New Delhi’s growing importance for Washington. 
Although Pakistan remains a tactical ally in the “war on terror” and especially in the 
manhunt for Ben Laden and al-Qaida lieutenants, India is the strategic partner the 
Americans value today. This country – which Washington constantly touts as “the biggest 
democracy in the world” - is in fact more stable and, incidentally, better reflects the idea the 
neo-conservatives have of freedom. India weighs more and more heavily on the globe: the 
United States is probably counting on New Delhi to help it police the Indian Ocean, even 
counteract China’s growing influence (whether this goes through Myanmar or Gwadar in 
Pakistan). And Washington can probably count on New Delhi’s support on several sensitive 
issues such as the NMD (National Missile Defense). 
 
Two shadows may, however, cloud the picture in the very near future. At a time 
precisely when China is manifesting its hostility toward the idea of India having a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council – on the pretext that any expansion of this council would 
jeopardize the necessary reform of the current institution -, the United States may disappoint 
India’s hopes. Indeed India may be deluding itself about American support. 
 
A still more delicate issue has to do with Iran and the energy crunch India is faced 
with. With an economic growth of 7-8 % annually, at the end of the current decade India will 
replace South Korea as fourth largest consumer of energy behind the United States, China 
and Japan. This growth exacerbates the shortage in energy/raw materials the country 
already suffers from. Repeated power cuts attest to this and are detrimental to the economy. 
To alleviate this obstacle, India does not hesitate to do business with countries more or less 
ostracized from the international community, not only Sudan,23 Myanmar, country with which 
India will soon be linked via a gas pipeline, but Iran as well. In January 2005, the state-
owned Indian Oil Corp. contracted with the Iranian company Petropars to exploit natural gas 
resources from Pars, an area which has the largest natural gas reserves in the world known 
to date. India is determined to purchase natural gas from Iran, even if it means putting the 
required pipeline through Pakistan. Such an energy supply contract would strengthen the 
                                                
23 New Delhi invested 750 million dollars there in the Greater Nile Oil Project. 




ties between India and Iran, the two countries already having entered into a strategic 
partnership two years ago. Not only is India helping Iran to build a deepwater port in 
Chabahar to compete with Gwadar in Pakistan, but military cooperation between India and 
Iran is allegedly about to take on a rather sophisticated technological dimension, with the 
development of submarine batteries that could allow Teheran to forego the Russian 
technology which is ill-suited to warm waters. 
 
Such a rapprochement bothers Washington, which is doing its best to isolate 
Teheran so as to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear program. On her visit to India last 
March, Condoleezza Rice again issued warnings that the American ambassador in New 
Delhi already proffered in attempt to divert India from this path. She claimed to be aware of 
the scope of the energy problem facing India, proposing, for one, to seek sources of supply 
in Turkmenistan – which would route the pipeline through Afghanistan – and also, to study 
together the possibility of cooperation in the area of civil nuclear power.24    
 
The Indian authorities reacted vehemently to what appeared to them as an outside 
pressure bordering on interference. Natwar Singh retorted that they had no problem 
whatsoever with Iran. The Communist Party of India (Marxist), a key element in the 
parliamentary coalition that backs Manmohan Singh’s government, protested that the United 
States should not interfere with a decision made by three sovereign countries.25 The United 
States may well nevertheless try to sabotage the pipeline project between Iran and India by 
intensifying its pressure on Pakistan, an obligatory point of passage for the structure and its 
weak link: Islamabad cannot disregard the United States’ wishes with as much pluck as 
India does. 
 
 The outstanding questions in India-U.S. relations are all of major importance, be it 
Iran, civil nuclear power, arms contracts or a seat for India at the UN. But for the moment, 
continuity in policy between the government borne out of the 2004 elections in India and the 
preceding administration is particularly striking with regard to its relations with the United 
States, such that it is not an exaggeration to speak of a deepening. 
                                                
24 The latter approach meets with strong support among several think tanks, including the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, as can be seen in the recent report by Ashley J. Tellis that it published, entitled “South 
Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent.” 
25 It should be noted that the communists are also very hostile to India’s purchasing weapons from the United 
States, not only for ideological reasons but also out of fear of making the country’s defense excessively 
dependent on the United States. 
